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Do fiscal councils impact fiscal performance? 
Giovanni Coletta*, Carmen Graziano**, Giancarlo Infantino*** 
Abstract 
The lack of budget transparency and projections accuracy have been among the 
determinants of the last four decades high deficit and debt, as the recent 2008-2009 economic 
crisis has highlighted. In order to improve fiscal policy process and budget transparency, the 
European Union (EU) stated more stringent fiscal rules monitored by Independent Fiscal 
Bodies, that have the capacity to “tie the hands” of policymakers tempted by deviations from 
socially optimal choices according to the academic circles. 
The present paper aims at empirically verifying if Fiscal Councils (FCs) in Europe (as a 
complement or substitute for the Fiscal Rules - FRs) have an impact on Governments’ fiscal 
decisions and if this impact exists and is positive which feature of their functioning is relevant for 
their effectiveness. 
The data elaborated with a panel regression model are the actual and foreseen (one year 
ahead) public finance and economic data of eleven European Countries1. The yearly planned 
change of the Cyclically Adjusted Budget Balance (CAB) 2 is interpreted as the discretionary 
fiscal policy and data about FCs and FRs are those of the European Commission (EC) 
Database on Fiscal Governance (data on fiscal institutions of the European database were 
opportunely adjusted, controlled and rebuilt for the missing years to construct the Fiscal Council 
Index - FCI). 
This work (with the caveats related to the used data) provides empirical support for the 
hypothesis of a positive impact of FCs on fiscal performance; leading to the conclusion that if 
there are clear and strong FRs, the presence of fiscal institutions with solid basis in national 
institutional framework (strong legal basis) could positively affect political decisions. 
 
JEL Classification:C33,E61,E62,H68 
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1
 Till 2011 only a few European Union (EU) Member States(MSs) have in their institutional framework the strictu-
sensucalled “Fiscal Council” (FC, according to the OECD and EU definition), whereas the most have institutions that 
perform some of the functions of an independent Fiscal Council (see EC, 2006a; Hagemann, 2010). 
2
 Since 2005, with the reform of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), the CAB has become the key indicator for both the 
assessment of country-specific medium-term fiscal objectives (MTO) and of the fiscal adjustment imposed to MSs in 
excessive deficit position and furthermore its use it’s quite common in literature to look at change in fiscal policy stance 
(Fatas e Mitov 2009). 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Since 1970 the attitude of governments in projecting growth with systematic optimism in the 
planning phase of the budget, together with inertia in the budget execution, determined 
significant excessive deficits. This phenomenon is known as deficit bias. 
In particular in the EU, over the last 14 years, the MSs have recorded a divergence between 
budgetary commitments taken in their Stability and Convergence Programmes (SP-CPs)3 and 
their implementation, turning the medium-term budgetary position (MTO) of “close-to-balance” 
or “in surplus” in a moving target. 
Since the mid-1990s a small but growing literature has argued that non-partisan agencies 
could shape policymakers’ incentives in a more credible and effective way than numerical limits 
on budgetary aggregates (see Debrun et al 2012), in order to break bad government habits 
above mentioned.  
These bodies with the role of watch dogs of public accounts would reduce the information 
asymmetry between policymakers and voters to the extent that such asymmetry is the primary 
source of the deficit bias4 
In March 2005, following this view, the EU’s Finance Ministers agreed on a number of 
changes to the SGP, with the stated aim of strengthening FRs and improving their 
implementation under the control of an independent fiscal body (such as FCs). 
In 2011 the EU Directive on “requirements for budgetary frameworks” (the so called “Six 
Pack”) stated that “biased and unrealistic macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts can 
considerably hamper the effectiveness of budgetary planning and impair commitment to 
budgetary discipline“. 
In 2012 the European Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance (in force since 
January, 1 2014) recognized to an “independent body” at the national level the mandate to 
monitor compliance with national fiscal policy rules and produce (or at least “assess or 
validate”) macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts used for the budget preparation in each EA-
MS. 
Institutions having the characteristics of an independent “Fiscal Councils” (FCs) already 
exist in many EU countries (they include the Economic Council in Denmark5, the Government 
Debt Committee6 in Austria, and the Working Party on Tax Revenue forecasting7 in Germany). 
Some institutions are in charge for providing forecasts or/and conducting positive analyses on 
                                                 
3
 These reports called "stability programmes" for Euro Area Member State (EA-MS)  and "convergence programmes" for 
non-EA-MS are identical in regards to the content. After the reform of the SGP in 2005, these programmes include the 
MTO's, calculated for each MS as the medium-term sustainable average-limit for the country's structural deficit. The MS 
is also obliged to outline the measures to be implemented in order to attain its MTO. 
4
A FC can raise the public awareness about the consequences of certain policy paths through independent analysis, 
assessments, and forecasts, by contributing to a stability culture directly addressing fiscal illusion (see Debrun and 
Kumar 2007). 
5
 It is an advisory body providing macroeconomic forecasts and analyses on fiscal policy issues (such as the functioning 
of the public sector, the tax system, fiscal sustainability, fiscal stance, issuing policy recommendations). It also monitors 
compliance with current FRs, so assessing recommendations as needed to ensure compliance. 
6
 It has a mandate to assess on regular basis the sustainability of fiscal policy, taking into account the economic cycle, 
with a focus on debt sustainability and the quality of public finance. Its members are nominated by the federal 
Government, social organisations and representative bodies. It receives funding from Austrian National Bank and 
realises an annual Report containing recommendations to the Government. 
7
 It prepares revenues projections on which the budget is based; anyway these ones are preliminary affected by 
Governments’ macroeconomic forecasts on economic growth. 
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fiscal policy issues; others for issuing normative statements and recommendations on the 
conduct of fiscal policy. Information about them has been collected through the European 
Commission (EC) survey on Fiscal Governance in the EU-MSs. We will use these data to 
explore, if the establishment of a FC also as a complement of FRs affects the fiscal behaviour of 
governments. 
The paper is structured as follows: after reviewing the existent economic  literature on FCs 
in Section I, we explain the main problems related to EU MSs fiscal performance in Section II. 
Data description and analysis are reported in Section III; the last section contains concluding 
remarks. 
2 DEFINITIONS AND LITERATURE 
2.1 Definitions 
Before proceeding it’s worth spending some words on definitions of fiscal performance, FRs 
and FCs. 
Fiscal perfomance 
About fiscal performance, according to the IMF and OECD definition, we refer to the 
budgetary discipline requiring that governments maintain fiscal positions that foster 
macroeconomic stability and sustainable growth
8
 (minimizing the distortion in the economy as 
well).  
Some economic analyses underline that Governments can’t create new economic activity, 
but only redistribute the income and wealth created by private sector (see Kirchner 2009). This 
redistribution can be realised either among several sectors of the economy or across time (see 
Taylor et al 2009). The activism of the fiscal policy to stimulate aggregate demand lies on the 
concept that governments extra spending influence the economy. The change in budget 
balance measures the fiscal impulse that government spending and tax changes are supposed 
to impart to economy (see Taylor et al  2009). 
There have been theoretical and empirical attempts to link fiscal policy to growth as well, 
through the new endogenous model to growth (see Easterly and Rebelo 1993).The result of 
these studies demonstrates that a prudent fiscal policy is necessary but not sufficient for rapid 
economic growth; but an imprudent fiscal policy hampers growth, threatens macro stability and 
carries high costs to economy. 
Cross-country analyses of fiscal performance are difficult to carry out for several reasons. 
First of all there is a lack of a common definition to consider, second the different time and 
country specific coverage of data and politics, third the linkage with other politics making difficult 
the examination of fiscal policy separately from them. 
Among the measures the actual overall balance - as a share of GDP - could highlight the 
impact effect of fiscal policy. Since the absolute magnitude of the fiscal deficit depends directly 
                                                 
8
 With the words of Musgrave (1964): “(regarding to fiscal performance) what matters are changes in 
budgetary positions relative to changes in GNP […] the only satisfactory way to measure the effects of 
budget policy on GNP is through an econometric model which isolate the fiscal factors”. 
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on the size of the state and the nature of the economy, Blanchard (1990) makes the point that 
any improvement on the overall balance
9
 - as an indicator of the impact effect of fiscal policy - 
would involve estimating marginal propensity to consume, and future paths of fiscal and 
macroeconomic variable. Another measure commonly used is the cyclically-adjusted budget 
balance (CAB) obtained by removing the cyclical component of the budget balance (that is the 
product of the output gap by the output semi-elasticity of the balance) from the overall balance. 
The basic reason related to the use of this indicator is related to the fact that removing 
temporary or cyclical elements from the balance, one would get a clear view of the actual fiscal 
situation of a country. In fact nominal budget balance figures are too volatile to be used as a 
reference point for policy making (a country that seemed to be close or moving towards a 
balanced budget, suddenly find it off when the cyclically condition changed , see Larch, Turrini 
2009). 
The CAB, especially the CAPB(Cyclically-Adjusted Primary Budget Balance), is commonly 
employed to measure the discretionary
10
 fiscal policy, as it excludes the cyclical component 
related to government’s expenditures (e.g. unemployment insurance benefits and social policy 
expenditures, that are higher during economic recessions than during booms) and revenues 
(e.g. tax revenues are higher during booms than during economic crises). In the case of CAPB 
the component of interests on public debt from the public deficit are excluded as well. In this 
way, the remaining component indicates the effort of the government to contain/increase 
changes in expenditures/revenues, also in the perspective of long-term sustainability. 
Therefore, the CAB (and the CAPB with greater reasons) was chosen by the EU to measure the 
dynamics of public finances in terms of country-specific MTO
11
, as well as of the fiscal 
adjustment imposed to MSs in excessive deficit position, as stated in the Stability and Growth 
Pact (SGP). Just as an example of its informative capability, the CAPB on average improved 
the years following the introduction of FRs as the government expenditures adjusted for the 
cycle grew more slowly remaining broadly stable over the period 1990-2005. The main caveat 
of this measure is that there are no clear and incontestable methodologies for estimating the 
cyclical components of Government’s expenditures and revenues. 
Following these premises budgetary forecasts (tax , expenditure, public debt and National 
Gross Product) are the necessary starting point to asses the direction and the objectives of 
fiscal policy. Mismatching between actual and forecasted data (especially in terms of economic 
growth) significantly affect ex post assessment of fiscal policy and the evaluation of right 
countercyclical fiscal policy (see IMF 2013)
12
. 
                                                 
9
 Inflation adjusted. 
10
 The discretionary fiscal policy is usually well interpreted as the change in the budget balance and in its components 
under the control of government. It is usually measured as the residual of the change in the balance after the exclusion 
of the budgetary impact of automatic stabilisers (EC definition ). 
11
 The Italian SGP - called Economic and Financial Document (EDF) - describes the main consolidation targets for Italy 
in terms of the MTO related to the CAB. It mentions also the main FRs in force such as the Domestic Stability Pact, to 
define the contribution of local authorities to consolidation targets, and the Healthcare and Pharmaceutical Expenditure 
ceiling, to control the growth of health expenditure. Finally, the mentioned document for the 2014 describes guidelines 
for the establishment of the new Parliamentary Budget Office (PBO) with responsibilities for the assessment of 
macroeconomic and public-finance forecasts contained in the planning documents; this body will also report the 
discrepancy between the actual budget and its forecasts, envisaging the possible action to be taken. 
12
 Optimistic growth projections, reflected in budget aggregates, could have the same impact of an active expansionary 
fiscal policy. 
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Fiscal Rules 
FRs have attracted significant attention over the time in literature as the secure remedy to 
eliminate large deficits. They are defined as quantitative (numerical) targets, or statutory or 
constitutional restriction, on fiscal policy setting a specific limit on a fiscal aggregate such as the 
budgetary balance, debt, spending, or taxation. In other words, these rules are a specific, 
binding constraint on the government’s range of policy options. Neither legislated policy rules 
nor guidelines are not considered to be FRs, because they do not impose binding constraints on 
present or future governments (see Kennedy et al  2001). In the 1992, the Maastricht Treaty set 
out convergence criteria that countries must satisfy to participate in the European Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU)
13
. In 1997 the Maastricht Treaty’s provisions were strengthened by the 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). In addition to the Treaty’s debt and deficit rules, the SGP 
requires that MSs set MTOs of budgetary positions close to balance or in surplus, in order to 
provide sufficient flexibility to allow the operation of automatic fiscal stabilizers remaining within 
the 3 per cent deficit limit. The application of these objectives at national level (FRs and multi-
annual targets) depends on Government’s policy decisions. Therefore every EU-MS defines its 
fiscal rules as numerical targets for budgetary aggregates such as government budget balance, 
expenditure, or revenue developments, but also debt at national and subnational level. The 
effectiveness of national/subnational rules depends on: 1) the coverage of the government 
sector (in particular the policy coordination in federal and highly decentralized systems); 2) their 
legal foundation (effectively constraining parliamentary discretion requires Constitutional 
amendments or qualified majority acts); 3) the effective impact of the rule on the quality of 
national public finances. Numerical FRs suffer from several weaknesses. First, unless carefully 
constructed, rules can in some circumstances (e.g. simple deficit and debt ceilings) result in 
pro-cyclicality (see IMF, 2004). Second, rules can be harmful to the quality of public finances 
through inadvisable compositional effects when, for instance, pro-growth public investment is 
cut to respect an expenditure cap (see Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2004). Third, where political will 
is lacking, rules can motivate creative accounting and off-budget operations, undermining 
transparency and, ultimately, democratic control over the budget (see von Hagen and Wolff, 
2006).  
FiscalCouncil 
According to the EC definition FC is a permanent agency with a statutory or executive 
mandate to assess publicly and independently from partisan influence government’s fiscal 
policies, plans and performance against macroeconomic objectives related to the long-term 
sustainability of public finances, short-medium-term macroeconomic stability, and other official 
objectives.  
Academic circles recognise to these bodies the role to address excessive deficits (see 
Table1). 
  
                                                 
13
 Under the Treaty, two main numerical criteria determine the fiscal discipline: the government deficit as a percentage 
of GDP can’t exceed the reference value of 3 per cent of GDP; and the ratio of gross government debt to GDP can’t 
exceed the reference value of 60 per cent. 
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Tab. 1 Mapping the tasks of FCs  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: IMF 2013. 
 
Anyway the actual influence of FCs could depend only on several factors related to their 
establishment and functioning: media support and visible impact on the debate over policy 
matters, as well as sustained, high quality and visibly independent analyses over long periods of 
time.  
Debrun and Kinda (2014) help to clarify the role and functions of FCs through a specifically 
built dataset
14
. 
IMF dataset shows that 22 countries belonging to OECD have so far established a FC and 
10 out of them have done it after 2010. New FCs include the Parliamentary Budget Office in 
Canada and South Africa, the Office for Budget Responsibility in the United Kingdom, and the 
High Council of Public Finance in France. In October 2013, the Spanish Parliament approved a 
law establishing a FC. Each body is classified on the basis of these criteria: legal independence, 
safeguard on budget and the composition/appointment/size of the staff. 
Among the FC surveyed by FMI, 90 percent are attached to the legislature (parliamentary 
budget office), while the remaining are stand-alone bodies
15
.  
With respect to their remits, there are three main categories of FCs. A first group includes 
bodies that provide independent forecasts used in the formulation of the budget, or against 
which the official projections are, or can be, assessed. A second group comprises entities with a 
                                                 
14
 Including Fiscal Councils envisaged by legislative texts adopted in the end of January 2013. 
15
 Parliamentary budget offices have historically emerged in presidential political systems (United States and Korea),but 
have more recently spread to a great variety of advanced and developing countries (such as Italy). Stand-alone FCs are 
the closest to the model suggested in the academic literature and are also present in a wide variety of countries (only 
two countries - France and Finland - have their fiscal councils attached to the supreme audit). 
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mandate to provide normative views on the appropriateness of the overall stance of fiscal policy 
from a cyclical perspective, or the desirable timeline to restore fiscal sustainability. A third group 
includes councils that are tasked with providing independent forecasts of macroeconomic and 
budgetary variables necessary for the elaboration of the annual budget (see Hagemann 2010). 
The monitoring of the compliance with fiscal policy rules and the costing of policy measures 
are generally not included in the FCs’ responsibilities with the exception of the recently new 
established FCs (the Italian one among them). Around the world the majority of FCs benefits 
from legal protections against partisanship when fulfilling their mandate, even though only less 
than half of them (more commonly older councils, such as in Germany and in Denmark) has 
their budget protected from arbitrary cuts undermining their ability to fulfil their mandates. FCs 
influence the conduct of fiscal policy indirectly through the public debate, and only rarely 
through direct action in the budget process. Anyway, all FCs prepare public reports with a 
significant media impact.  
Providing forecasts that are either binding or linked to a “comply or explain” clause is rare; 
however, a sizeable number of new FCs holds formal consultations with the Government or 
hearings in Parliament on a regular basis. The FC’s size can vary greatly according to their 
remits, the complexity of the government system, and the availability of human and financial 
resources. The dataset suggests that small councils tend to have narrower remits than larger 
ones: small fiscal councils (with less than 10 full-time professionals) are often tasked with the 
assessment of fiscal policy (e.g. Finland, Ireland, and Slovenia), while much larger councils 
usually combine different functions including forecasts preparation, long-term sustainability 
analyses, and the costing of policy measures (e.g. Netherlands, South Korea, and the United 
States). Most of councils’ staffs are academics, policy experts, and civil servants, but a growing 
share of councils have in their senior management foreign experts (increasing the perception of 
independence from local politics and allowing access a greater pool of talents). 
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Tab. 2 Cross Country Overview  
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Australia Parliamentary Budget Office x x x   x   x 
Austria  Government Debt Committee  x x  x x x x  x 
Belgium  High Council of Finance  x x  x x    x 
Belgium  Federal Planning Bureau  x x x   x x  x 
Canada  Parliamentary Budget Office x x x x  x x  x 
Denmark  Danish Economic Council  x x x x x x x  x 
Finland  National Audit Office of Finland  x x x x x x  x x 
France  High Council of Public Finance  x  x x x x  x x 
Germany  German Council of Economic  x x x x  x x  x 
Ireland  Irish Fiscal Advisory Council  x x x x x x x  x 
Italy Parliamentary Budget Office  x x x x x x  x x 
Japan  Fiscal System Council  x   x     x 
Mexico  Center for Public Finance Studies  x  x  x  x x x 
Netherlands  Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy 
Analysis x x x  x  x  x 
Portugal  Portuguese Public Finance Council x x x x x x x x x 
Romania  Fiscal Council  x x x x x x x x x 
Serbia  Fiscal Council  x x x x x x x x x 
Slovak Republic Council for Budget Responsibility x x   x x x  x 
Slovenia  Institute of Macroeconomic Analysis and 
Development  x x    x x  x 
Slovenia  Fiscal Council  x x x  x x   x 
Sweden  Swedish Fiscal Policy Council  x x  x x x x  x 
United Kingdom  Office for Budget Responsibility  x x x  x x x x x 
United States  Congressional Budget Office  x x x   x x  x 
Source our elaboration on  IMF 2013. 
2.2 Economic literature 
The economic literature on the role of fiscal councils in the budgetary process and on fiscal 
outcomes is relatively abundant. 
The number is reduced when we consider only the economic authors that use econometric 
model in the explanations of the impact of FC on fiscal outcomes (the aim of our research). 
In terms of budgetary process the main existent literature demonstrates that countries with 
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FCs would tend to have lower bias in their official budgetary forecasts; in particular, according to 
the EC(2006) delegation of the forecasting seems to be an efficient way to address optimistic 
biases in macroeconomic projections; furthermore the role of the institutions in place in public 
debate seems to be relevant considering the large media coverage. Furthermore IMF (2010) 
elaborates the budgetary Institutions Index, comprising several components: i) planning and 
negotiation; ii) approval and implementation; iii) allocation of funds between the different 
programs, concluding,  that high quality budgetary institutions seem to be associated with less 
pro-cyclical fiscal policies in the context of multi-annual macroeconomic and budgetary 
frameworks. A more transparent budgetary process (with fiscal pro-cyclical coefficients lower 
than in those with less transparent budgets) seems to play a more important role in shaping 
fiscal cycles than other characteristics. 
On this question Debrun (2011) highlights that an independent FC could recover the 
informative asymmetries of voters, who cannot observe the competence of policy-makers
16
. 
Fiscal institutions are assumed to be generally preferred by voters requiring the strictest 
guarantees of independence from politics; as IMF (2012) using the impact on CAPB of fiscal 
decentralisation programs- consisting of reassigning spending and revenue collection 
responsibilities from the centre to sub-national government- demonstrates that spending 
decentralisation is associated with stronger fiscal performance, especially when transfer 
dependency of subnational governments is low; nevertheless subnational FRs do not seem to 
play a relevant role in ensuring a better fiscal performance.  
The literature following reported (with a particular focus on the econometric model and fiscal 
and economic variables employed) is on tracks of the direct relation between FCs’ presence 
and fiscal outcomes.  
EC (2006) confirms, through empirical analyses, the influence of the design of FRs and 
fiscal institutions (FIs) in determining sound fiscal policies. In particular the study highlights that 
the primary CAB on average improved the years following the introduction of FRs (primary 
government expenditure adjusted for the cycle tends to grow more slowly in the years following 
the introduction of numerical expenditure rules and the relative reduction as GDP ratio seems to 
depend on an increase in the share of government finances covered by numerical rules)and 
remained broadly stable over the period 1990-2005
17
.  
Fabrizio and Mody (2006), focus on the need to guarantee the representativeness of 
several, also ethnic and religious, components through consistent electoral rules, using a panel 
data of new and potential EU-MSs over the period 1997-2003. They conclude that more 
inclusiveness hurts budgetary outcomes; but the establishment of checks, exercised by FCs, in 
the competition for fiscal resources can provide a significant help in containing deficit. Among 
others the research of Debrun Xavier et al (2012) is interesting. The authors, testing the FCs’ 
influence on fiscal performance, demonstrate that stronger media presence of the FC in any 
given year is correlated with greater planned fiscal activism for the following year, regardless of 
whether the fiscal plans envisage a more ambitious fiscal consolidation or a greater stimulus. 
Their interest is focused on the media impact of fiscal councils at times when we would expect 
them to speak out, that is in the aftermath of budgetary slippages or policy shifts. The results 
                                                 
16
 Opaque public accounts prevent voters from distinguishing the effect of pure luck from the impact of a competent 
policy-making, and so the notional budget deficit resulting, efficiently combines shocks and noise. 
17
 Strong rules, enshrined in law or Constitution, and automatic enforcement mechanisms, seem to have a larger 
influence on budgetary outcomes. 
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are fairly consistent across alternative regressions (Fixed-effects or Pooled Ols).The control 
variables, output gap and public debt, display negative signs. This means that a reduction in the 
output gap (less positive or more negative) encourages fiscal activism, whereas high public 
debts are less conducive to activism. 
On the same question IMF (2013) presents an econometric exercise on 26 countries over 
the period 1998-2010 where the FR index, the FC legal independence, FC staff number (high 
level), FC high-media impact, FC forecasts provision assessing, and FRs monitoring appear to 
be very significant. On the contrary, the mere existence of a FC does not seem to play a 
determinant role. The features of functioning of these institutions are relevant for their impact on 
fiscal performance. 
However IMF(2013) considers that a reverse causation between the fiscal performance and 
FCs is possible, as intrinsically disciplined countries could reveal their deep preferences by 
adopting certain institutions. A complementarity’s relation between FRs and FCs is 
demonstrated. 
On the question of the reverse causality of FC on fiscal performance it’s worth mentioning 
Alesina and al (1999). The authors show that the primary deficit average of some Latin-
American countries over the period 1980-92 is determined significantly by indicators of both 
budgetary institutions (FRs and FCs). Restricting the sample to include only years of democratic 
government, the coefficient for the index is slightly smaller, although still significant. Causality 
running from institutions to outcomes would prove the existence of the commitment hypothesis. 
Anyway a reversal causality could run from fiscal performance to FRs and FCs, as countries 
strongly committed to fiscal balance could show this preference by establishing independent 
institutions (so called “signalling hypothesis”).  
Debrun and Kumar (2007) study has a relevant role in terms of complementarity of FCs and 
FIs. The authors estimate a multivariate panel model for EU-MSs (excluding Luxembourg) over 
the period 1990-2004, to test if countries that cannot explicitly abolish FRs could have an 
incentive to cheat by stealth through creative accounting (so called “smokescreen hypothesis”). 
The SGP and run-up to EMU seem to have had a negative impact on the FR index and the FC 
index seems to be complementary to the FR index.  
In summary, the recent econometric literature, highlighted that FCs helped countries to 
contain forecast bias on projected cyclically-adjusted public expenditures and revenues (degree 
of pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy depends negatively on the quality of budgetary institutions). In 
terms of their effects on budgetary process, the related influence depends on the degree of 
governments’ commitments to fiscal austerity (FRs in force), on the public acknowledgment of 
their role and on socio-political variables (as the fragmentation of government, the degree of 
leftism; decentralisation; and voters’ participation). The FC structure and, in particular, the 
features of its functioning are relevant for both the budgetary process and (especially) fiscal 
outcome (see Debrun Xavier et al 2012, IMF 2013). 
A particular aspect analysed is the complementarity of FRs and FCs (not their mere 
existence, but their specific characteristics: legal independence, independent budget, high-
media impact, forecasts provision assessment) considering that FRs can fail and the existence 
of FCs can deter violations of them and have positive influence on the accuracy of budgetary 
forecasts measured by discrepancies between actual and forecasted real GDP growth. Our 
literature overview doesn’t rest about this issue, because the legislative acts in Europe consider 
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existent the synergy between FC and FRs, stating that the FC in charge has to check the 
compliance with rules. 
Finally, as emerged from reverse causality relations a “signalling hypothesis” should exist: 
strongly committed governments would adopt FRs and FCs, in order to ‘certify’ their 
commitment to austerity. Following a summary table showing the main empirical results 
obtained employing in econometric panel regression the FR index and FC index to demonstrate 
the direct influence of FC on fiscal outcomes. 
Tab. 3 Main studies about the FC impact on fiscal outcome  
Authors Model 
Dependent 
variable 
Regressors Results 
Fabrizio et 
al (2006) 
Panel 
regression 
Primary 
balance to 
GDP ratio 
Debt-to-GDP ratio, the fiscal 
institution index, the inflation 
rate, the FR index and the 
openness of the economy 
The primary-balance-to-GDP ratio seems to be 
positive correlated with the debt-to-GDP ratio, 
the fiscal institution index, the inflation rate, the 
FR index and the openness of the economy; 
more inclusiveness hurts budgetary outcomes. 
Debrun et al 
(2007) 
Multivariate 
panel model 
CAPB 
CAPB of the previous year, 
the lagged debt ratio, the 
government stability, the 
output-gap and the 
delegation rules. 
CAPB seems to positively depend on its 
previous year level, the lagged debt ratio, the 
government stability and the overall fiscal rules 
index; a negative correlation has found for the 
output-gap. 
Debrun et al 
(2012)- 
Panel 
regression 
DCAB 
Lagged output gap, lagged 
public debt level, FCs media 
presence in year T-1,time 
dummies 
The coefficients are positive for FC media 
presence and negative for output gap and debt 
level: The results are fairly consistent across 
alternative regressions (fixed-effects or 
pooled).The control variables display the 
expected signs: a reduction in the output gap 
encourages fiscal activism, whereas high 
public debts are less conducive to activism. 
IMF (2013) 
Pooled 
regressions 
The primary 
balance in 
percentage 
of GDP 
One year ahead output-gap, 
FCs, fiscal rules monitoring, 
previous-year debt,  
the FRs index, 
FC legal independence, FC 
staff number,FC high-media 
impact,FCforecasts 
provision assessing. 
Previous-year debt, the FRs index, FC legal 
independence, FC staff number (high level), 
FC high-media impact, FC forecasts provision 
assessing, and fiscal rules monitoring appear 
to be very significant. On the contrary, the 
mere existence of a FC does not seem to play 
a determinant role. 
3 MAIN PROBLEMS IN EU MS’ FISCAL PERFORMANCE 
The gaps between actual and forecasted fiscal and economic data of the studied countries 
highlight that the problem is not only of providing unbiased forecasts, but to enhance 
transparency and hamper information asymmetry of citizen who should also have access of all 
inside information of governments.  
The analysis of the actual net borrowing
18
 referred to the considered countries (Figure 1-a) 
shows that - excluding Denmark, Spain, and partly the UK -all of them (Austria and Germany 
are included in this latter group) have a negative or slightly negative net borrowing before 2007. 
 
  
                                                 
18
 The actual and forecasted net borrowing values are built as the growth rate of the difference between the actual and 
forecasted revenues and expenditures values reported in EC assessments of SP-CPs. 
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Fig. 1-a  Actual net borrowing by countries (2000-2011) for Italy and main European countries 
 
Source: Our elaboration on Eurostat data. 
 
In Italy the actual net borrowing is always negative, slightly lower than -4.0 per cent. Italy 
performed better than France, especially over the period 2008-2011. The United Kingdom and 
Spain are characterised by the worse performance after 2007. 
Moreover, the Italian dynamics is generally worse than that of Netherlands, Belgium and 
Sweden (see Figure 1-b); only Portugal shows among the other European countries a worse 
performance than Italy. During the economic crisis Italy has followed the trend of all these 
countries, excepting Portugal, whose deficit has reached in 2009 the level of about -10 per cent. 
Fig. 1-b Actual net borrowing by countries (2000-2011) for Italy and other European countries 
 
Source: Our elaboration on Eurostat data. 
 
If we consider the gap between actual and foreseen net borrowing (see Figure 2-a), the 
United Kingdom confirms its unsatisfactory performance, especially over the period 2004-2008;  
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Fig. 2-a Gap between actual and foreseen 1-year ahead net borrowing for Italy and main European countries (2000-2011) 
 
Source: Our elaboration on Eurostat data and SGP data.  
 
the situation seems slightly to improve after 2008. Denmark seems to perform very well with a 
3.0 p.ps positive difference between actual and foreseen deficit in 2010. Italy has not a negative 
performance after 2006, but there is a negative difference amounting to -2.0 p.ps in 2001 in 
regard to the previous period. Austria (after 2004) and Germany show a gap around zero. As 
regard with the comparison with the other EU countries, generally only Portugal seems to have 
a worse performance before 2007. After 2007 all European forecasters have be outperformed 
by Italy. Sweden shows a better forecasting capacity especially after 2009. 
Fig. 2-b Gap between actual and foreseen 1-year ahead net borrowing for Italy and other European countries (2000-2011) 
 
Source: Our elaboration on Eurostat data and SGP data. 
 
In terms of real GDP growth (see Figure 3-a) all countries have generally a similar trend, 
with a positive growth over the period 2000-2007, a deep recession in 2008-2009 and a limited 
recover after 2010. Generally, Italy shows the worst performance among the reviewed 
-4.00
-3.00
-2.00
-1.00
0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
7.00
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Italy Germany UK France Spain Austria Denmark
-7.00
-5.00
-3.00
-1.00
1.00
3.00
5.00
7.00
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Italy Belgium Netherland Portugal Sweden
  
 
17 
 
Fig. 3-a Actual GDP growth for Italy and the main European countries (2000-2011) 
 
Source: Our elaboration on Eurostat data. 
 
countries. In the period before the economic crisis, the United Kingdom and Spain have the 
higher GDP increase; the economic crisis hit greatly these countries, while Germany and 
Austria demonstrated to be more resilient. By taking into account the other European countries 
(see Figure 3-b), all countries have shown a similar pattern. Anyway, Sweden, and partly 
Belgium and Netherlands, have behaved in 2010-2011 better than Italy.  
Fig. 3-b Actual GDP growth for Italy and the other European countries (2000-2011) 
 
Source: Our elaboration on Eurostat data.  
 
In terms of differences between the actual and 1-year ahead forecasts of real GDP growth 
(see Figure 4-a), we can distinguish two groups. The United Kingdom and Denmark have ‘pro-
cyclical’ errors: positive before 2007 (actual>forecasts) and negative after (actual<forecasts).  
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Fig. 4-a Gap between actual and foreseen 1-year ahead GDP growth in the main European countries (2000-2011) 
 
Source: Our elaboration on Eurostat data and SGP data. 
 
Also Spain shows a similar trend, though in lesser extent. In Italy, instead, there is no specific 
pattern, with a fluctuation around zero in the range -0.5/+1.0 per cent. Finally, France and 
Germany show a wider fluctuation range, with a greater frequency, respectively, of negative and 
positive errors. 
In comparison with the other European countries (see Figure 4-b), Italian forecast errors 
seem to be more limited. In particular, Sweden and Netherlands seem to be unable to correctly 
forecast the economic crisis over the period 2009-2010. 
Fig. 4-b Gap between actual and foreseen 1-year ahead GDP growth in the other European countries (2000-2011) 
 
Source: Our elaboration on Eurostat data and SGP data. 
 
In terms of debt’s growth rate (see Figure 5-a) we make our analysis by building clusters by 
countries showing a similar trend. In the first group we can observe an unusually high debt’s 
growth rate in Spain, in Denmark and, in a lower extent, in the United Kingdom. In the second 
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group France and Germany, and, in a lower extent, Austria have a peak, respectively, in 2009 
and 2010, returning quickly to the usual pattern soon afterwards. 
Fig. 5-a Percent increase in public debt for the main European countries (2001-2011) 
 
Source: Our elaboration on Eurostat data. 
 
Among reviewed countries Italy keeps substantially constant its rate, which has fluctuated in 
the last 3 years in the range +2.0/+5.0 per cent; only in 2009 the debt grew at a maximum rate 
of nearly +6.0%. 
Fig. 5-b Percent increase in public debt for the other European countries (2001-2011) 
 
Source: Our elaboration on Eurostat data. 
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Fig. 6 Percent increase in public debt (2000-2012) 
 
Source: Our elaboration on Eurostat data 
 
In comparison with the other European countries, Italy shows a more limited cyclical 
component in the debt growth rate. Netherlands (with a peak in 2008), Belgium and Portugal 
(with relatively higher growth rates) show a similar trend. Sweden is the only country which has 
reduced its debt by 15.0 per cent in 2008, followed by the increase by the same magnitude over 
the following two years.  
The y-o-y percent increase of revenues (see Figure 7) records on the whole a common 
procyclical trend: it shows  a common growth over the 2004- 2007 period with a range of 5- 10 
per cent (the highest values recorded by the Spain) a fall in 2009 and a recovery in 2010. 
Fig. 7 Y-O-Y percent increase of Public Revenue 
 
Source: Our elaboration on Eurostat data. 
 
The y-o-y percent increase of public expenditure  highlights  a  pattern with high variability: 
the most of the lines shows up and down oscillations, among them Spain shows the highest 
increase in 2008 and a fall in 2009 and Netherlands and Sweden showing an increase in 2008 
and 2010 respectively.  
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Fig. 8 Y-o-Y Percent increase of Public Expenditure 
 
Source: Our elaboration on Eurostat data. 
4 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
4.1 The basic model 
According to the empirical works above mentioned we constructed an econometric model 
to simulate how the presence of a FC could affect fiscal performance of the EU-MSs considered 
and which feature of its functioning is determinant for its effectiveness. 
The traditional fiscal equation (1) presents as depended variable a measure, at time t, of 
fiscal policy and as control variables the state of economy, the gross government debt and the  
lagged dependent variable.  
In symbols: 
 𝐵𝑎𝑙𝑡 = ß𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑡 + 𝜆𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜌𝐵𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜀 (1) 
  
The fiscal policy could be expressed either in terms of actual budget balance (in this case ß 
captures both the automatic stabilizers and the endogenous change in discretionary fiscal 
policy), or in terms of a cyclically adjusted measures (in this case the parameter ß is capturing 
the endogenous response of fiscal policy to the business cycle ) (see Fatas e Mihov 2009).  
In our exercise the model presented is a panel regression (see Debrun et al 2012, IMF 
2013) that has an intercept varying by country but constant during the time period considered 
(distinguishing each country analysed from the others)19. 
  (2) 
t=1,2,3,4,5,…T and  i=1,2,3,4…N 
                                                 
19
 The advantages of panel regression lay on controlling the individual heterogeneity through modelling the dynamic 
behaviour of individuals. The result is a major estimates’ efficiency. 
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Where  is a scalar, is a (Kx1) vector of regressors, β is a (Kx1) coefficients’ vector, 
is the so called unobserved heterogeneity and εitis the errors vector behaving as random noise. 
We take aim to make inference on β, the indices i and t denote years and countries 
respectively. 
The dependent variable chosen as indicator of fiscal performance is the absolute value of 
the planned variation of the CAB (ΔCAB)20(difference between its yearly value)- see Debrun e al 
2012-, while the proxy of the behavior of the economic cycle is the output-gap. Other regressors 
are the public debt log, and two indices that summarise the relevant features of the national FRs 
in charge and FCs. Fiscal and Economic data come from the SP-CPs of the 11 European 
countries considered (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, 
Portugal Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom); as data regarding to FRs and fiscal institutions21 
are those of the EC Database on Fiscal Governance. In the case of FCs the EC data have been 
completed for the missing years (from 2000 to 2009) controlled and transformed to get indices 
(see Annex). 
4.2 Data description 
The European countries included in the present econometric analysis are chosen among 
those listed in EC database on fiscal institutions and FRs. Furthermore the choice responded to 
the consideration that only the former EU founders present in their SP-CPs a complete time 
series on the projections of their budgetary position and the underlying economic assumptions 
since 2000. They are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal 
Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
Although the caveat to use public projections present in the SP-CPs lays on the fact that the 
EU-MSs governments don’t make forecasts on the same scenario: some follow the unchanged 
legislation (Italy among them), others the unchanged policies: the choice of the governments 
reduces the amount of expenditure forecasted and consequently the deficit results. The EC 
services collect a broad set of information on national independent fiscal institutions of EU 
countries through an annual survey, launched in 2006. The questionnaire concerns to the 
existing national institutions, others than the government, the Central Banks and the Parliament, 
which may have a direct or indirect influence on the conduct of fiscal policy. Only institutions 
primarily financed by public funds are considered; private think tanks and private research 
bodies are therefore excluded.The survey is focused on information related to the main 
characteristics of these domestic public bodies covering their mandates and functions, the 
composition of their governing boards, formal status, presence near the Government or 
Parliament, media visibility and influence on public debates on fiscal policy. The first 
questionnaire was sent to all EU MSs in the context of the Working Group on the Quality of 
                                                 
20
 The changes in CAB is commonly used to describe the effects of the discretionary policy (see Larch and Turrini, 
2009). In fact the CAB is a good indicator indeed to:1) separate the contribution of discretionary fiscal policy to a given 
change in the headline deficit from the effect of the economic environment; 2) assess fiscal impulse; 3) examine 
whether a given fiscal policy is sustainable. Furthermore the fundamental issue that justifies the employment of DCAB is 
related to the fact  that this variable allows recording only the endogenous response of the fiscal policy to the business 
cycle (see Fatas and Mitov 2009). 
21
 Considered as a good proxy of the FCs properly said on the basis of the EC definition. 
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Public Finances (WGQPF) attached to the Economic Policy Committee (EPC). The current 
questionnaire is divided into six sections following explained. 
I) General description (divided into two other parts) requiring: a) a description of the 
institution, the main motivations for its introduction and the relevant data related to their creation 
and any major changes and b) the relation of the institutions with Government and/or parliament 
over the period considered; II) Activities containing questions about the mandate of the 
institution and relative specific tasks; III) Independent analysis on fiscal policy 
developments requiring information on: a) the economic aggregates and sectors covered by 
the forecasts (if the fiscal institution provides forecasts and/or long-term projections of 
macroeconomic and/or budgetary variables), b) the use of budget forecasts produced (SCP and 
MTBF are also reported), c) the sectors covered by the normative statements and 
recommendations issued by the institution and the way the government reacts to it; IV) 
Governing/high-level board containing questions related to the composition of the board of 
the institution (background of the members, appointment procedures, compatibility of members' 
responsibilities with other political posts, size of the board, voting procedures);V) Status 
concerns the institution’s placement (whether it is formally attached to the Parliament or the 
Government, the sources of financing the institution and its access to inside information ; VI) 
output and visibility of the fiscal institution. This section of the questionnaire deals with 
reports, publications, communication issued by the institution to the general public. It also allows 
evaluation of the fiscal institution’s influence on public debate.  
We have built a set of FC indices on data of EC Governance dataset (see Annex) checked 
on the basis of the country fiches about fiscal framework across MSs prepared by EC 
Directorates for EPC peer review (see EC 2012). All of them tested in our simulation model to 
find which among them realized the best fiscal equation specification.  
After ten tests the No. 6 version of the index (see Table 5, row 6 - obtained giving a weight 
of 50 per cent to the Section V of EC questionnaire) and the No10 version (see Table 5, row10 
obtained giving the whole weight to the Section V) have given the best model specification. 
The indices built are a weighted composition of features of functioning of FC (having as 
starting point the real situation of the fiscal institutions surveyed).It’s worth highlighting that the 
weight expresses the relative importance of each component: the whole weight given to the 
legal status augmented the relevance of this section (in correspondence to the others) without 
leaving out of consideration the score obtained in the other sections.  
The representation of the number 10 indices (see Figure 9) shows the best position of 
Austria and United Kingdom followed by Netherlands  Belgium and Denmark. 
Our exercise stressed that the first two countries achieve the highest results thank to the 
weight given to the legal status component but the scores of others sections are relevant too In 
fact, the normative analysis and the media visibility matter in Austria (Debt Government 
Committee (Austrian FC)) too ; as the independent public finance analysis is relevant in 
Northern European countries22. 
 
 
                                                 
22
 The Danish Economic Council established in 1963 and the  Netherlands Bureau of Public Administration in 1945 
have sound positions in national framework and high reputation. 
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Fig. 9 Fiscal Council Index n10 (2000-2011) 
 
Source: our elaboration on EC Data 
 
The FRs indices is built (by EC Services) taking into account 5 criteria: 1) the statutory base 
of the rule; 2) the room for revising objectives; 3) the mechanism of monitoring compliance and 
enforcement of the rule; 4) the existence of pre-defined enforce mechanism; and 5) media 
visibility of the rule. Score for each criteria are predefined and weighted on several defined 
dimensions such as the sector of Public administration covered, the number of rules present 
and so on (see EC fiscal governance dataset explanations of the construction of FR index). 
According to this index Denmark, Spain and Sweden (till 2010) demonstrate binding fiscal rules 
(see Figure 10): expenditure rules represent the cornerstone of fiscal framework23in Denmark 
and Sweden, while the balance budget rule and coordination among different government 
layers is relevant in Spain. The Spanish existing law, in fact, establishes that in case the 3 per 
cent deficit threshold is breached all governments layers have to contribute to the payment of a 
possible fine in proportion to their share over the overall deficit (EC 2010).  
                                                 
23
 The experience of such rules in these countries demonstrate that follows: 1) the adoption of these rules guarantee 
more centralized budgeting process such as top-down budgeting procedures; 2) it appears decisive to ensure the 
effectiveness of budget balance rules; 3) it should cover the whole general government sector with proper coordination 
(see EC 2010). 
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Fig. 10 FRs index in some European countries (2000-2011) 
Source: Our elaboration of European Commission data. 
 
The planned variation of the CAB (see Figure 11), on the whole shows a restrained 
variability up to 2008 (but Austria in 2005 and UK in 2003 and in 2004).Among the determinants 
of its contained variation may be highlighted the fact that the provisions about the debt and 
deficit contained in SGP becoming more binding with the introduction of a common 
currency(1999). 
Fig. 11 Planned yearly change in the CAB (2001-2011) 
 
Source: Our elaboration on SCGP data and European Commission data (Ameco database).  
 
For the foreseen output-gap (see Figure 12), all the countries (but Portugal) follow a similar 
pattern.  
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Fig. 12 Foreseen output-gap in some European countries (2001-2011) 
 
Source: Our elaboration on Eurostat data. 
 
Tab. 4 Standard deviation for the all variables and Fiscal Council index number 10 
 
Overall Between Within 
      DCAB   1.5282 0.6101 1.4140 
FR index 0.9321 0.9165 0.3152 
FC index 0.1231 0.1135 0.0578 
Output-gap 1.4762 0.5151 1.3913 
Debt 0.4791 0.4953 0.0830 
 
The statistical description of the variables considered in the model (see Table 4) shows 
more within variability for variables like ΔCab and the output-gap, the contrary for variables like 
FRs and FCs. and Debt.  
4.3 Results 
Here following we described the results of the model based on the fiscal index number 10. 
The shape of our model is the following: 
 
Our panel data is balanced (all countries have data for all years). 
Appling the panel estimators beginning from Pooled OLS and ending with Random Effects, 
we find that the coefficients of Pooled OLS and Random Effects are more significant. The 
assumptions of the last estimator are: linearity, strict exogeneity of x'it with εit and αi. Analysing 
the residuals, we can affirm that individual effects exist. Moreover with the OLS estimator we 
use the cluster option, used when the individual effects are present in the model. The results of 
the model are illustrated in the following tables: the Table 5 summarises all the results of the 
regressions, while the Table 6 focuses on FR and FC indices.  
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Tab. 5 Outcome of estimators 
Variable Pooled OLS Random Effects  Fixed Effects 
FR Index 
b 0.259 0.259 0.336 
se 0.17 0.16 0.41 
FC Index  
b 1.392 1.392 2.627 
se 1.20 1.20 1.86 
Output-gap 
b -0.232 -0.232 0.029 
se 0.09 0.09 0.11 
Public Debt 
b -0.195 -0.195 5.50 
se 0.29 0.29 2.13 
N 117 117 117 
 
Tab. 6 Outcome of estimators 
 Pooled OLS(cluster) Random Effects (robust) 
FR Index                       0.259 0.279 
 (0.1894) (0.139) 
FC Index    1.392***     1.197*** 
 (0.60) (0.54) 
Note: Robust t-statistics are in parentheses, with (***), (**), and (*) denoting statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent 
threshold respectively. 
 
The Random Effects and Pooled OLS (that exploits both the within and between variability) 
estimates of FC index are significant and have a positive sign; this demonstrates that this 
regressor have a positive influence on fiscal policy activism differently from the others 
(coefficients of output gap and debt that have a negative sign). 
The Hausman test rejected the null hypothesis of extra orthogonality conditions imposed by 
the Random Effects estimator. This demonstrates the violation of the second moment 
assumption required by random effects: 
 
Then the Pooled Ols estimator is advisable. 
The Pooled OLS estimates for the coefficient of FC with the stress given to the legal status 
component ,are significant and positive. These results highlight the relevance of the legal basis 
of the FC (independence and wide access of inside information) on the fiscal outcomes: an 
external body could have a role on fiscal output only if its position is properly defined into the 
national institutional framework and it’s role is widely and socially recognized as highly 
institutional one . 
Table 5 shows in details that the presence of stronger FC in any given year is correlated 
with greater fiscal activism in the following year. The debt’s coefficient with negative sign is not 
expected. The contained percent increase of public debt showed above (see Figures 5) could 
help to answer: debt growth has to respect a cap according to the SGP statements and this 
provision reduces per se the margins of the politicians’ fiscal activism. The output gap is 
expected negative because the aim of the active politics is to reduce it. 
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The results are fairly consistent also with the inclusion of two statistically significant time 
dummies (2008 and 2009) to consider the breakdown related to the economic crisis. 
In order to demonstrate if FRs and FCs are complementary or substitutes, we employ a 
linear Wald restriction test for the sum of coefficients of both variables FRI and FCI (integer 
values from -3 to +3, including 0). In the case of N6 FC Index the sum of the coefficients in 
random regression seems to be significant only for negative values; whereas no conclusive 
evidences emerge from robust regression. However, both variables seem to be fungible by 
choosing N10 FC index (all the weight to Section V and weights of the other Sections are 
zero)both parameters seem to be complementary. 
5 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
This paper analyses the impact of a FCs on fiscal performance of 11 European Countries 
using a regression panel The presented literature highlights the positive impact of FC on fiscal 
process and consequently on fiscal outcome with small evidence of the direct positive influence 
of a FCs‘ presence on fiscal outcomes (the fiscal performance quantitative representation is 
among the problems). 
We contribute to fill this gap in two main ways: 
1) demonstrating that the FC have an impact on fiscal outcomes; 
2) this influence is strictly related to the combination of  its functioning features. 
Our fiscal equation comprises - as proxy of the Fiscal Performance - the yearly variation of 
CAB (commonly used by EC and the recent economic literature) and - as fiscal institutions ten 
weighted combinations of the features of their functioning - the FC indices. 
The simulation demonstrates that the indices that gave relevance to the “legal status” 
features of FCs functioning provide the best model specification.In other terms that legal status 
(i.e.whether it is formally attached to the Parliament or the Government, how it is financed and 
the access to inside information) of a FC establishment has relevance for the national fiscal 
outcomes. The results were fairly consistent also with the inclusion of two statistically significant 
time dummies (2008 and 2009) to consider the breakdown of the economic crisis. 
Explaining the results in fiscal terms in any given year the presence of fiscal institutions, that 
have a strong legal basis, together with the FRs in place is correlated with greater fiscal 
activism for the following year. Our conclusions are in line with Hangeman(2010): “In smaller 
countries with a relatively less developed infrastructure of unofficial bodies, the creation of a 
fiscal council enables the pooling of local expertise (creating analytical synergies) and access to 
financial and informational resources not otherwise available to unofficial bodies. In larger 
countries, however, where unofficial bodies are prevalent and potentially influential through the 
media and by active participation in public policy debates, a principal advantage gained from the 
creation of a fiscal council is the latter’s access to the more detailed confidential data 
normally restricted to legislative and executive agencies. In all countries, however, a 
desired benefit to the government of creating an official fiscal council is to signal the 
government’s commitment to good behavior”.  
But some cautions are necessary to better read the research results: 
 governments don’t make forecasts on the same scenario(some follow the unchanged 
legislation others the unchanged policies) the choice reduces or augments the expenditure 
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and consequently the deficit without any endogenous intervention; 
 there are many aspects of fiscal process that are not considered (i.e. the way in which new 
expenditures are financed). 
Focusing on the variables used in the model we highlight the following caveats: 
i) the indicator of fiscal performance, the absolute value of the yearly planned change of 
the CAB, has the advantage to isolate the discretional policy component of the 
government balance from the component affected by the economic cycle Anyway, CAB 
estimation can’t rely on a correct and agreed methodology of calculation and this could 
determine problems of social and political acceptance.  
ii) the data used for FC indices have been rebuilt for the year 2000-2009 and the set of 
fiscal council indices built are only ten. The combinations created are only a part of all 
the possible existent cases.  
Under this light we may conclude that, for the 11 European countries studied, if there are 
clear and solid fiscal rules the presence of fiscal institutions could affect political decision with 
the relative prevalence of the strong legal basis but caveats in data and other considerations 
(there are other ingredients of their success and the right combination it’s a matter of other 
conditions24 we haven’t examined) call for caution. 
                                                 
24
 E.g. the permanence of such institutions in institutional framework that affects their credibility and folk ‘s culture. 
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ANNEX FISCAL COUNCIL INDEX’S CONSTRUCTION 
The FC index has the aim to summarize the relevant features of FCs in each country (see 
Debrun Xavier and Manmohan S. Kumar, 2007) explicitly referring to their role in preserving 
fiscal discipline and in facilitating the implementation of the rules. It is built on the basis of the 
2010-2011 answers of the EC questionnaire on Fiscal Governance checked on the basis of the 
2011 country fiches prepared by EC Directorates for EPC peer review about fiscal framework 
across Members States (EC 2012). 
The surveys available on EC web-site refer to 2010 and 2011, data from 2000 to 2009 have 
been reconstructed removing the institutions born in the following years and assuming 
invariance of the answers of institutions that do not change over time.  
The index construction consisted of: 
 the calculation of a numerical score for each answer given; 
 the introduction of a weighting scheme applying at this score to consider the relative 
importance of every section of the questionnaire to which the answer belongs to.  
Calculation of the score 
The score within each Section is obtained according to these instructions, the same for 
each fiscal institution:  
 to dichotomous answers (yes-not) has been given a score of 1 if yes, 0 if not; 
 to the numerical answers that reflect qualitative response, considering that higher score 
reflects better performance, the relative importance is expressed proportionally in 
percentage;  
 to numerical answers, such as the number of employees, where the maximum value is not 
defined in advance a dichotomous score (0-1) has been assigned if that number is 
respectively below or above the average of the correspondent values for all the institutions 
of all the countries involved; 
 the answers "n / a" (question not applicable), "." (missing event though the question applies 
to the institution) or ”*” (additional information) are not considered for the calculation of the 
indicator;  
 the answers "*1" or "0*" (the asterisk indicating additional information), are considered 
equivalent to those without an asterisk. 
It is interesting to note that institutions in 2011 reported a higher average score on the 
media visibility, while is fairly low the level of interaction with government and parliament (see 
Section I), as well as the level of independence in terms of macro and/or budgetary forecasts. 
The scores for each institution, however, don’t help us to differentiate the relevance of each 
aspects/features of Fiscal Council functioning expressed by the sections of the questionnaire.  
One way to explore this aspect may pass through a weighting scheme related to each 
section.  
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The weighting scheme 
Table 7 shows 10 different fundamental weights25 (expressed as percentage) related to 
importance given for every single year and country to each section of the questionnaire. Their 
combination determines 10 different sets of indices according to the following criteria: 
1. prevalent weight to the section VI; 
2. equal weight to all sections and considering  the three subsections of the III (Section) as 
independent ones;  
3. half weight to the Section II and the remainder equally distributed between the remaining 
sections;  
4. half weight to the Section I and the remainder equally distributed between the remaining 
sections; 
5. half weight to the Section IV and the remainder equally distributed between the remaining 
sections;  
6. half weight to the  Section V and the remainder equally distributed between the remaining 
sections; 
7. half weight to the section III (considered as a single section), and the remainder equally 
distributed;  
8. all weight to the Section II; 
9. equal weight to all sections considering the part III as a single section;  
10. the whole weight to the Section V. 
The 10 cases represented the circumstance that one or another of these sections 
(indicating particular aspects of fiscal councils) has an influence in monitoring fiscal process. 
Tab. 7  Weights distribution as percentage 
N. 
progressive 
weighting 
I II III.a III.b III.c IV V VI Tot 
1 2.5% 2.5% 10.0% 10.0% 10.0% 10.0% 15.0% 40.0% 100.0% 
2 12.5% 12.5% 12.5% 12.5% 12.5% 12.5% 12.5% 12.5% 100.0% 
3 10.0% 50.0% 3.3% 3.3% 3.3% 10.0% 10.0% 10.0% 100.0% 
4 50.0% 10.0% 3.3% 3.3% 3.3% 10.0% 10.0% 10.0% 100.0% 
5 10.0% 10.0% 3.3% 3.3% 3.3% 50.0% 10.0% 10.0% 100.0% 
6 10.0% 10.0% 3.3% 3.3% 3.3% 10.0% 50.0% 10.0% 100.0% 
7 10.0% 10.0% 16.7% 16.7% 16.7% 10.0% 10.0% 10.0% 100.0% 
8 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
9 16.7% 16.7% 5.6% 5.6% 5.6% 16.7% 16.7% 16.7% 100.0% 
10 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
  
                                                 
25
 Other combinations exist but these 10 are the basic one to quantify in a simply way the (relative/absolute) relevance 
of the basic aspects of a fiscal council functioning expressed by the sections of the questionnaire. 
  
 
32 
REFERENCES 
AAVV(2012),“Rules and Institutions for Sound Fiscal Policy after the Crisis” Banca d’Italia 
publication -Book n.12, Papers presented at the Banca d’Italia workshop held in Perugia, 31 
March-2 April, 2011  
Alesina, Alberto, and Tabellini, Guido (1990), “A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and 
Government Debt”, Review of Economic Studies 57, 403–414.  
Alesina, Alberto, Hausmann,R. Holmes,R. and Stein,E. “Budget institutions and fiscal 
performance in Latin America”, Inter-American Development Bank, WPS 394, 1999. 
Auerbach, Alan J., Gale William G., and Harris Benjamin H.(2010) "Activist Fiscal Policy." 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 24(4): 141-64. 
Beetsma, Roel and Debrun, Xavier (2007), “The New Stability and Growth Pact: a First 
Assessment”, European Economic Review 51: 453-77. 
Bohn Henning (1998) “The Behaviour of U. S. Public Debt and Deficits, ”The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 113 (3): 949-963 
Calmfors, Lars (2012), “The Swedish Fiscal Policy Council: Watchdog with a Broad Remit”, 
CESifo Working Paper No.3725. 
Calmfors, Lars and Wren-Lewis, Simon (2011), “What Should Fiscal Councils Do?”, 
Economic Policy, October, pp. 649-695.  
Calmfors, Lars (2011), “The Role of Independent Fiscal Policy Institutions” CESifo Working 
Paper Series No.3367. 
Calmfors, Lars (2010), “The Role of Independent Fiscal policy Institutions”, Report to the 
Prime Minister‘s Office, Finland. 
Castellani, Francesca ,Debrun, Xavier (2005), “Designing Macroeconomic Frameworks: a 
Positive Analysis of Monetary and Fiscal Delegation”, International Finance 8, 87–117.  
Debrun, X. (2011), “Democratic Accountability, Deficit Bias, and Independent Fiscal 
Agencies”, International Monetary Fund Working Papers No.11/173. 
Debrun, Xavier, Marc, Gérard and Jason, Harris (2012)-Has the Time for Fiscal Councils 
Come at Last?- OECD Conference Centre, Paris 23-24 February  
Debrun X., Gérard, M. and Harris,J. (2012),”Fiscal Policies in Crisis Mode: Has the Time 
for Fiscal Councils Come at Last?” OECD PARLIAMENTARY Budget Officials and Independent 
Fiscal Institutions- 4th Annual meeting OECD Conference-Centre, Paris23-24 February 2012 
Debrun, X. and Tidiane, KInda (2014), “Strengthening Post-Crisis Fiscal Credibility: Fiscal 
Councils on the Rise—A New Dat”, International Monetary Fund Working Papers No.14/58. 
Debrun, Xavier and Kumar,Manmohan (2009), “The Discipline-Enhancing Role of Fiscal 
Institutions: Theory and Empirical Evidence”, Chapter 3 in Ayuso-i-Casals and others (eds.) 
Policy Instruments for Sound Fiscal Policies; Fiscal Rules and Institutions, Palgrave McMillan. 
Debrun, Xavier, Hauner,David, and Kumar,Manmohan (2009), “Independent Fiscal 
Agencies”,Journal of Economic Surveys 23, 44-81. 
Debrun X., Moulin,Laurent, Turrini,Alessandro, Ayuso-i-Casals,Joaquim, and 
Kumar,Manmohan (2008), “Tied to the Mast? The Role of National Fiscal Rules in the European 
Union”, Ecoomic Policy 54, 298-362. 
 
 
  
 
33 
Debrun, X. and Kumar, M.S. (2007), “Fiscal Rules, Fiscal Councils and All That: 
Commitment Devices, Signaling Tools or Smokescreens?”, in Banca d’Italia (ed.), Fiscal Policy: 
Current Issues and Challenges, papers presented at the Public Finance workshop held in 
Perugia,29-31 March 2007, pp. 479-51 
Campos, E. and Pradhan, S. (1996), “Budgetary Institutions an Expenditure 
Outcomes”,The World Bank –Policy Research Working Paper 
Easterly, W. and Rebelo, S.,1993:” Fiscal Policy and economic growth: an empirical 
investigation” NBER Working Paper 4499 
European Commission (2006),AA.VV., “Public Finance in EMU 2006”, European Economy, 
2006. 
European Commission (2006),”'National numerical fiscal rules and institutions for sound 
public finances”, in Public Finances in EMU 2006, Part III, pp. 137-195. 
European Commission (2009), “Fiscal rules, independent institutions and medium-term 
budgetary frameworks”, in Public Finances in EMU 2009, Part II.2.4. 
European Commission (2010), “Current domestic fiscal framework reforms across the EU”, 
in Public Finances in EMU 2010, Part I.5, pp. 73-80. 
European Commission (2010),”'National fiscal frameworks”,  in Public Finances in EMU – 
2010, Part II.3, pp. 98-115. 
European Commission (2011), “Fiscal frameworks across Member States: Commission 
services country fiches from  the 2011 EPC peer review”, European Economy Occasional 
Papers No.91. 
European Commission (2011), “Fiscal governance and sovereign spreads”,'in: Public 
Finances in EMU  2011, Part II.4, pp. 111-128. 
Fabrizio, Stefania, and Mody,Ashok (2006), “Can Budget Institutions Counteract Political 
Indiscipline” Economic Policy 21, 689–739. 
Fata, A. and Mihov, I.(2009),”The euro and Fiscal Policy, National Bureau of Economic 
Research WP 14722 
Hagemann, Robert (2010), “Improving Fiscal Performance Through Fiscal Councils”, 
OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 829. 
Hallerberg, Mark and Von Hagen (1999) “Electoral Institutions, Cabinet Negotiations, and 
Budget Deficits in the European Union”-NBER Chapters, in: Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal 
Performance, pages 209-232 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. 
Kennedy, Suzanne Robbins Janine Delorms Francoise (2001), “The role of fiscal rules in 
determining fiscal performance”, Banca d’Italia workshop. 
IMF (2010), AA.VV., “Budget Institutions and Fiscal Performance in Low-Income 
Countries”, International Monetary Fund, WP/10/80, 2010. 
IMF (2012),AA.VV., “Fiscal performance, institutional design and decentralisation in 
European Union countries”, International Monetary Fund, WP/12/45, 2012. 
IMF (2013),AA.VV., “The functions and impact of fiscal councils”, International Monetary 
Fund, July 2013. 
Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance 2008-2011 Economical and Financial Planning 
Document. 
Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance 2014,Economicand Financial Document – Italy’s 
Stability Programme. 
 
  
 
34 
Jonung, Lars and Larch Martin (2006), “Improving Fiscal Policy in the EU: the Case for 
Independent Forecasts”, Economic Policy 21, 491-534. 
Kydland, Fynn, and Prescott, Edward (1977), “Rules Rather Than: The Inconsistency of 
Optimal Plans”, Journal of Political Economy 85, 473-91. 
Larch, Martin and Turrini, Alessandro (2009),-“The cyclically-adjusted budget balance in 
EU fiscal policy making: A love at first sight turned into a mature relationship”, European 
Commission Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, Publications Economic 
Papers 374 
Lebrun, Igor (2009), “Fiscal Councils, Independent Forecasts, and the Budgetary Process: 
Lessons from the Belgian Case”,‖ Chapter 15 in Ayuso-i-Casals, Joaquim and Others (eds.), 
Policy Instruments for Sound Fiscal Policies, Palgrave McMillan. 
Musgrave, Richard (1964), ‘On measuring Fiscal performance’, in The Review of 
Economics and Statistics, Volume 46 N2, pages 213-220. 
Musgrave, R.A. and Musgrave, Peggy B. (1980), Public finance in theory and practice. 
NewYork, McGraw-Hill. 
Musgrave, Richard (1985), ‘A Brief History of Fiscal Doctrine’, in Auerbach, A.J. and M. 
Feldstein,’Handbook of Public Economics’, Volume I, Chapters 1, pages 1-59. 
Office for Budget Responsibility (2011) “Briefing paper No. 1-Forecasting the public 
finances”Office for Budget Responsibility (2012)” Economic and Fiscal Outlook” 
OECD (2012), “Draft principles for independent fiscal institutions”, background document 
No.3 for Session on discussion on draft principles for independent fiscal institutions, OECD 
Parliamentary Budget Officials and Independent Fiscal Institutions 4th Annual Meeting, Paris  
23-24 February 2012. 
Oakland, William (1969) ‘Budgetary measures of fiscal performance’ Southern Economic 
Journal, Volume 35 N4 pages 347-358. 
O’Donoghue, T. and  Rabin, M. 2001.”Choice and procrastination”.Quartely Journal of 
Economics,116:121–160.-The page referenced in the text refers to the 2000 working paper 
version 
Poterba, J.M. Von Hangen, J.(1999)”Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance” National 
Bureau of Economic Research 
Taylor, J, Makin, T, Carling, R edited by Kirchner (2009) “Fiscal Fallacies:.the failure of 
activist fiscal policy” Cis Policy Forum  18, The Center of Independent Studies 
Von Hagan and Harden 1995 "Budget Processes and Commitment to Fiscal Discipline", 
European Economic Review 39(3): 771-779.  
Wyplosz, Charles (2005), “Fiscal Policy: Institutions versus Rules” National Institute 
Economic Review 191. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Ministry of Economy and Finance 
Department of the Treasury 
Directorate I: Economic and Financial Analysis 
Address: 
Via XX Settembre, 97 
00187 - Rome 
 
Websites: 
www.mef.gov.it 
www.dt.tesoro.it 
 
e-mail: 
dt.segreteria.direzione1@tesoro.it 
 
Telephone: 
+39 06 47614202 
+39 06 47614197 
 
Fax: 
+39 06 47821886 
